THE €12 MILLION QUESTION: ULTRA'S FUNDING CLAIMS UNDER SCRUTINY

An Ultra Times investigation into discrepancies between public announcements and financial reality

By The Ultra Times Editorial Team
December 21, 2025

I. THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT STARTED IT ALL

APRIL 3, 2025: A BOLD VISION

On April 3, 2025, Ultra Corporation published an official announcement that sent waves of optimism through the community:

"We're excited to announce that Ultra has successfully secured $12 million in funding, led by Luxembourg-based multi-family office NOIA Capital through its NOIA Digital Assets fund."

The announcement featured bold statements from newly appointed CEO Gus van Rijckevorsel:

"Just as Netflix redefined media consumption, Ultra will transform the gaming industry."

The post outlined how the funding would be used:

• Recruit top-tier talent
• Expand and upgrade the Ultra platform
• Prepare for strategic acquisitions
• Lay the foundation for a larger raise later in the year

MARKET REACTION

The announcement generated significant coverage:

• GAM3S.GG published: "Ultra Raises $12 Million in Funding"
• CoinTribune featured CEO interviews
• BlockchainGamer.biz covered the "new chapter"
• Multiple gaming and crypto outlets amplified the news

Community sentiment shifted dramatically positive. Discord channels filled with excitement. The UOS token saw trading volume increases.

THE COORDINATED ROLLOUT

What followed appeared to be a well-orchestrated strategic execution:

APRIL 28, 2025 - Community Manager Rod posted:
"You may notice some $UOS token movements over the coming days. We're working closely with a new partner who will be supporting $UOS across several initiatives."

APRIL 29, 2025 - Two major announcements:

1. UOS listed on MEXC exchange
2. Strategic partnership with Vaulta announced

The timing suggested a company with significant resources executing a carefully planned roadmap.

II. THE EXPANSION: APRIL - AUGUST 2025

A FIVE-MONTH MARKETING BLITZ

Following the funding announcement, Ultra embarked on an unprecedented expansion:

APRIL 2025:

• Maxime van Steenberghe appointed as Chief Operating Officer
• Vaulta partnership for blockchain infrastructure integration
• MEXC listing with $1.2M UOS + $50K USDT airdrop campaign

MAY 2025:

• Wachsman PR agency engaged (representing Solana, Visa, other major brands)
• "Flash Updates" become weekly ritual
• Multiple game launches announced
• Product development accelerates

JUNE-JULY 2025:

• Web Wallet development showcased
• Bridge infrastructure progress detailed
• Staking V1 preparations announced
• Bug bounty program launched ($2,000 rewards)

JULY 21, 2025:

• $1 Million Developer Grant Program announced
• Positioned as funding for ecosystem growth
• Multiple games and tools eligible
• Community encouraged to apply

AUGUST 2025:

• Ultra 2.0 platform revealed
• Full team attends Gamescom
• "UltraBoi" mascot introduced
• Vision for "social-first gaming" unveiled

THE NARRATIVE

Throughout this period, the company presented itself as:

• Well-capitalized with $12M in funding
• Executing against an ambitious roadmap
• Attracting premier partnerships and talent
• Building "the future of gaming"

Community members, developers, and potential partners made decisions based on this narrative.

III. THE SILENCE: SEPTEMBER 2025

WARNING SIGNS

By late August, the weekly "Flash Updates" began to slow. The energetic communication that had characterized the spring and summer months became sporadic.

SEPTEMBER 12, 2025 - Community Manager Njoythis posted:
"We know it's been a while since our last updates, and many of you are itching to hear more about what's next for Ultra. The team is aligning on priorities and want to ensure that the next information we share is complete and accurate. Our CEO, Gus, will provide a detailed community address by next Friday."

The community waited.

SEPTEMBER 19, 2025: THE REVELATION

In a Discord "Fireside Call," CEO Gus van Rijckevorsel addressed the community. What he revealed fundamentally contradicted the April announcement:

"Business Reality: Ultra's Gaming platform requires critical mass to succeed, which means large-scale funding (€50–100M) for user & content acquisition. Since that level of investment hasn't been secured yet, we can't continue aggressive spending on the game platform."

Then came the statement that would call everything into question:

"Funding Context: The €12M bridge earlier this year included €2M equity and €10M in debt facilities. Without clarity on the next fundraising round, tapping into that debt would risk the token, so it's being avoided entirely for the time being."

COMMUNITY REACTION

The Discord erupted. Members tried to reconcile the April announcement with September's admission:

IV. DISSECTING THE DISCREPANCY

WHAT DOES "SECURED FUNDING" MEAN?

The April 3 announcement stated Ultra had "successfully secured $12 million in funding." The phrase "secured funding" in standard corporate and investment terminology typically means:

• Capital that has been committed
• Money that is available for operations
• Resources that can be deployed

WHAT WAS ACTUALLY "SECURED"?

According to the September 19 admission:

COMMUNITY ANALYSIS

Community member "M4k" observed:

"The founder thinks like an entitled employee. Don't get fooled ALL entrepreneur only get paid when (and if) they make it. Most actually lose money but we never hear from them. This project needs a Leader."

Community member "damdamp" asked for clarity:

"I understand you're mad at D&N but this vendetta can't last forever. From my perspective of someone who follows the discussion but has never been involved... I have a hard time believing this picture of them being those evil scammers. They did a lot of mistakes but they also spent years on this project and built a lot of cool stuff."

V. THE MiCA FRAMEWORK

UNDERSTANDING MiCA

The Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA) entered into force on December 30, 2024—just over three months before Ultra's April announcement. As an Estonian company issuing crypto-assets in the European Union, Ultra Corporation OÜ falls under MiCA's jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 86: MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS

MiCA Article 86 establishes requirements for marketing communications:

"Marketing communications relating to crypto-assets [...] shall be clearly identifiable as such, be fair, clear and not misleading."

APPLICATION TO ULTRA'S CASE:

The April 3 announcement was undeniably a marketing communication. It was:

• Published on official channels
• Amplified through media coverage
• Used to generate positive sentiment
• Timed with exchange listing and partnerships

The question: Was it "fair, clear and not misleading"?

ANALYSIS:

• Fair? Debatable if 83% of claimed amount is inaccessible
• Clear? "Secured $12M funding" vs. "€2M equity + €10M unusable debt"
• Not misleading? Community clearly believed more capital was available

ARTICLE 88: CONTINUED DISCLOSURE

MiCA Article 88 requires:

"Issuers of [...] crypto-assets shall provide to the public [...] any material information concerning those crypto-assets."

TIMELINE ANALYSIS:

• April 3: Announcement made
• April-August: Aggressive expansion continues
• September 12: First indication of issues
• September 19: Truth revealed
• Gap: 169 days

MATERIAL INFORMATION WITHHELD:

• True amount of accessible capital
• Inability to use debt facilities
• Need for €50-100M (not €12M) to succeed
• Financial constraints on operations

POTENTIAL PENALTIES

MiCA violations can result in:

• Administrative fines up to €5,000,000
• Or up to 3% of total annual turnover
• Operational restrictions
• Reputational damage
• Civil liability to damaged parties

VI. THE INSIDER QUESTION

TOKEN MOVEMENTS AND TIMING

The April 28 Discord message warning of "token movements" raised questions about timing:

• April 3: Funding announcement
• April 28: "Token movements coming"
• April 29: MEXC listing (new liquidity)
• April-September: Period of market optimism
• September 19: Reality revealed

NICOLAS GILOT'S DISCLOSURE

On December 4, 2025, under community pressure, co-founder Nicolas Gilot disclosed compensation information:

"I took time to go back and added up everything I've earned from Ultra, salary, tokens, etc. and it comes out to about €141k per year before tax. After tax, that's roughly €85k, so around €7k a month in actual payout. For a CEO and founder, especially in the blockchain space, that's honestly pretty standard. If you look it up (and you should), the usual range is around $125k to $215k, and that's not even counting tokens, which is usually the biggest portion of earnings."

COMMUNITY RESPONSE

Community member "IAnaar" questioned the figures:

"So Nicolas, as an employee, was paid FIAT + dumped UOS? [...] So if I understand, you had 7k€ per month fiat salary + you sold 4k per month since 18 months + 50k per month for a defi project we never heard before Fabio told us? All of this saying every one you were not selling UOS?"

When pressed for clarification, Nicolas responded:

"I am done going back and forth constantly, it drains our time and energy that should go towards Ultra's future. Take this information and do what you want with it, but we aren't going to entertain accusations and defamation anymore. If it continues we'll have to remove individuals to maintain a productive environment."

Community member "Comrade" observed:

"So now we have the details of what nic 'earned'... However Would a thief give an account of what he 'stole'. Bottom line is, we have no idea what the truth is."

THE LEADERSHIP EXODUS

GUS VAN RIJCKEVORSEL:

• Appointed CEO: December 2024
• Made $12M announcement: April 2025
• Revealed truth: September 2025
• Last communication: September 2025
• Current status: Unknown, X/Twitter still lists him as CEO

DAVID HANSON:

• Co-founder with long history at Ultra
• Went silent: September 2025
• No Discord presence since
• No public statements

Community member "whyner" commented:
"David still hiding is wild 😂 confidence ain't coming back soon"

Community member "Sander" asked:
"Out of curiosity, what do you guys expect David to come and comment on that Nicolas hasn't commented on already?"

Community member "Comrade" responded:
"Out of common decency he should be communicating, he's been the central figure for this 7 year ordeal. But has sloped off into the woodwork since its all gone tits up. Cowardly really."

ROD (COMMUNITY MANAGER):

• Primary communicator: April-August 2025
• Exit announcement: August 9, 2025
• Timing: 41 days before September 19 revelation

Community manager "Njoythis" acknowledged Rod's departure:
"To Rod, we're grateful for the energy and commitment he gave Ultra and our community, and we wish him nothing but the best in his next adventures."

VII. THE INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE

COMMUNITY IMPACT

Several community members shared their experiences in Discord discussions following the September revelation.

COMMUNITY MEMBER "dakweenx":

"As someone who lost 60k$ (almost all life savings from nov 2021) in this shit project, I beg to differ. The real issue is that people can simply excuse their misconduct by portraying themselves as inexperienced and unaware, rather than as the seasoned entrepreneurs who claimed to have built and sold multiple companies in China for millions."

When another member suggested this was simply poor timing, "dakweenx" responded:

"I kept buying the falling knife till 2023 actually. But this dead project just kept going down. I could have bought memecoins like doge or pepe and still make money, but not with ultra. Even those who bet on cryptofluencers like eliott, becker or other scammers had the chance to make money if they kept buying during 2022-2023 dip, but not with ultra."

COMMUNITY MEMBER "Comrade" expressed broader frustration:

"Its frustrating, because there was always an assumption what ultra was building was genuinely a serious project and the cream would ultimately rise to the top, turns out almost any shit coin in gaming would have been a better bet. They're likely all deeply unserious projects the others just new how to play the game better."

Another comment from "Comrade":

"Ultra duped nowhere near enough people, the market was ripe for way more than what little they extracted, basically they sucked at what they're supposedly good at, which is bullshitting. To surmise they sucked at everything lol"

COMMUNITY MEMBER "Icarus" offered perspective:

"My opinion in general is anyone who sold their token deserves nothing, you invested, and sold your investment at a loss. Now you have zero claim lol [...] Mean in general not you. Point is if you sell your tokens you are no longer an investor in Ultra. I still think founders should be held accountable for the failures, no blind shilling from me. Ultra couldn't make revenue and didn't sell enough tokens, incompetence or not."

THE NFT COLLECTION ISSUE

Community discussion also revealed concerns about NFT collections sold on the platform.

"dakweenx" raised this issue:

"Also, every Uniq collection released on Ultra turned out to be a scam, without exception. The only legit Uniqs were the ones released by Ultra itself. The bithotel, elarium, agora, droidz, etc. they all turned to ashes."

When asked what made them scams, "dakweenx" explained:

"A lot of the creators promised perks attached to the uniqs but run away soon after cashing the money. Others like elarium were games that never came to be."

Another member questioned whether this was Ultra's fault: "Not Ultra fault then, look at 99% of NFT projects"

But "dakweenx" countered:

"Yeah sure. You think if Steam and Epic allowed scammers on their platforms, they wouldn't refund the users? They would get sued to oblivion."

Community member "Allego" added:

"Its Ultra fault, Ultra allowed them to create these collection after a 'screaning' say its safe"

COMMUNITY MANAGER "Njoythis" responded:

"Majority of NFT projects 'failed', all the teams were vetted at Ultra, with signed agreements in place. It's up to them to deliver their promises. We refused 100 x more projects because they were not meeting our requirements. Unfortunately Ultra was not in the position to reimburse, no NFT marketplace has ever done this, except in some extreme cases. Full disclosure I also lost plenty UOS on uniqs"

DEVELOPER IMPACT

The $1 Million Developer Grant Program announced in July raised particular concerns. From Discord discussions in late November, community manager "Njoythis" posted:

"No grants are given before UOS holders know! You are included in the voting process. Keep an eye out for the first upcoming shortlist!"

But with only €2M in actual accessible funding, questions arose about whether the grant program was realistic or if applicants were misled about resource availability.

VIII. THE DAO DEFLECTION

NOVEMBER 2025: A NEW STRATEGY

Following the September crisis, Ultra announced a new direction: the UltraDAO.

NOVEMBER 15, 2025 - Announcement:
"Join us for an Ultra Fireside Call with co-founder Nicolas. It's time to end the silence."

Nicolas Gilot, who had stepped back during Gus's tenure, returned to lead. David Hanson remained absent.

NOVEMBER 17, 2025 - "An Open Letter from Ultra":
"When we started Ultra, our vision was bold: to redefine gaming through true digital ownership and build a platform where players, developers, and creators could thrive together. Over the years, we built a full-fledged gaming hub including a store, marketplace, wallet, tournaments, game publishing tools, and a blockchain network powering it all..."

The letter acknowledged challenges but focused on future vision rather than past accountability.

THE DAO PROPOSAL

Throughout November-December, Ultra presented a series of proposals:

Community manager "Njoythis" explained the vision:

"Ultra would not exist without YOU. Whether you've supported us from the beginning or recently joined, we want to say thank you for being on this journey with us. This ones for you!"

COMMUNITY SKEPTICISM

The DAO proposal met mixed reactions in Discord discussions:

Community member "Benre" expressed confusion:

"I still don't understand this move to open the chain only to a few people and take this responsibility while it was possible to let everyone make whatever he wants. It could have been better but anyway"

Community member "Comrade" was cynical:

"The shift to Nicolas is a ploy to mitigate damage. They've created the space for Gus and Dave to get away. Nic is buying time and managing the crowd before he inevitably does the same."

Community member "Icarus" was more optimistic:

"Founders might not be the right people to save the project but at least setting up the DAO will have real control over some of its future - isn't that the point? Hope to see more info soon. Decentralize the growth as they say."

Community Member "Fabio" offered a critical assessment:

"Just because OÜ shareholder Nicolas is now talking to us and pretends to be suddenly interested in our opinion, does not make us a 'DAO'. Nothing at OÜ is decentralised and we're neither autonomous nor organised. The DAO thing is yet another Ultra classic."

He also noted:

"To be fair, the other shareholder David is not even doing that, he's just hiding and letting his buddy take the heat. [...] Regarding his statements: there is no reason at all to simply take his word for anything without actual documents proving his case."

THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP

Notably absent from DAO discussions: accountability for the April announcement, explanation of the 169-day gap between claim and truth, or commitment to transparency about token sales during that period.

VIII-A. DECEMBER 2025: THE FINAL BREAKDOWN

COMMUNITY EXHAUSTION

By December 2025, the community had reached a breaking point. Discord messages reveal complete loss of faith:

Community member "Froof" (December 16):

"Guys I think my faith is finally gone. Took some time. I don't even know what question to ask in the forum. 'Is ultra dead?' 'can we expect something good in 2026?' [...] We've got already soooo rekt by answers given past years, I don't see the point to ask anything now."

Community member "Yann":

"Same for me. What is the point of asking a question if you don't have any trust about the reliability of the answer? So many lies over the years.... No question for me then."

DAVID HANSON'S CONTINUED ABSENCE

Community member "whyner" (December 16):

"It seems like David and Nicolas have lost all motivation for the project. Where has the vision gone? Do they no longer believe in it? The fact that David still hasn't spoken publicly is staggering to me. He was the one driving the bullish sentiment (even though they screwed us over in the end, really). Who can still take this project seriously when even the founder doesn't give a damn?"

THE TECHNICAL DEBT REVELATION

On December 16, JC from Ultra Times revealed explosive details about Ultra's technical state during failed audit negotiations:

"We have already begun the audit work, investing a significant amount of time for free, between sessions with former employees and mapping out the architecture. It quickly became clear that the technology is becoming obsolete (e.g., dfuse is no longer operational) and that an enormous amount of reverse engineering will be required to address the massive 'gray areas' we identified."

"In short, this represents full-time work for several people over a 30-day period. Then, we proposed a service fee 2 to 3 times lower than market rates (which today would be worth 12 times more), to be paid in a token printed 7 years ago ($UOS). Yet, Ultra's counter-proposal suggests we work for free if no maintenance agreement follows, effectively meaning that unless we propose an extremely low maintenance flat fee, our labor of this audit remains uncompensated."

"This is why I consider this one of the worst professional insults of my career, even without accounting for the broader context and everything we have done for Ultra. I have many other similar cases on file, involving both ourselves and others."

KEY TECHNICAL ISSUES EXPOSED:

• dfuse (core infrastructure) no longer operational
• Massive "gray areas" requiring reverse engineering
• Technology becoming obsolete
• Insufficient documentation
• Former employees needed to explain architecture

Community member "MANDN" added:

"Tournament platform never worked properly and has not been usable for a long time. Blockchain and contracts are outdated. Dfuse no longer supported. How do we know Ultra is maintaining the rest of their services and securely."

OPERATIONAL COSTS AND TOKEN DUMPS

On December 17, 2025, community members tracked large UOS movements:

Community member "UltraRobert":

"I know that Ultra needs cash and try to sell their cashews at the highest price, like right now (1 UOS~1 cent). have you ever try to make revenue from what you've built??? really guys, that's pathetic! 7 years of amazing things built with pain and people behind, all for selling it 1 cent / UOS?!"

Community member "MANDN":

"1.5m UOS sent to KuCoin. 1.4m UOS sent to Gate. Guess team still don't want to be up front. Can't see any reason not show monthly expenses breakdown publicly, there should be no movements of UOS for anything else other than this right now."

Community manager "Njoythis" responded:

"Hey guys, the majority of UOS transfers you're seeing from Ultra wallets to exchanges are to cover operational costs. Those costs are currently at their lowest level since many years ago, roughly €40k per month."

QUESTIONS ON TIMING

Community member "IAnaar" raised critical questions:

"Why do you sell today? Since when did you program to sell? It happens right after a pump.... Are you guys now admitting you're pump and dumping? When are you going to sell again?"

Later: "In your quest of transparency, can you tell us how much are your cost per month? When do you have to pay? And when will you sell $UOS next time?"

These questions remained unanswered.

THE REVENUE PROBLEM

Community member "UltraRobert" offered business advice:

"The issue is not the expenses but the lack of revenue. Let me have a deep talk with Nicolas and you, David to create long term revenues, which is for me, as an experience international businessman in IT, the foundation of any company."

"And moreover guys, you have an amazing community, ready to help. It's not with a DAO that you will bring revenues, don't fool them or make them dream with whatever low assets you can have in your sleeve."

Later:

"From my perspective, nothing has changed since 2019. Still the same way of thinking, nothing relevant to bring revenues. You have now the tech (which is unfortunately not maintained well/entirely and aging badly), you have an amazing community (unfortunately ~10 people right now, even less maybe regarding your 'fireplace meeting'). [...] so in 7 years, you did nothing to create revenues from the start, maybe bring some titles that nobody bought... great ideas guys!"

"Even with nothing at all, companies can grow! Have you ever heard about lean startups guys?? AIRBNB, DROPBOX,... WAKE UP!!"

Community member "JBM" added context:
"Nah they compared themself directly with Amazon / apple and we bought it"

Another member: "Some people in here called Dave the next Steve Jobs"

CALLS FOR TRANSPARENCY

Community member "MANDN" outlined requirements for moving forward (December 16):

"Full audit of what happened to every single UOS ultra has spent and on what since inception. Tokenomics for the remaining UOS.

Name all partners Ultra invested in and what UOS they got and how much UOS remaining they are due.

List what partners are left with Ultra and the terms of the deals.

Publish monthly details of expenses for Ultra. Infra, team, partners etc so we know what monthly outgoings there will be.

Every movement of UOS from a team wallet needs to be documented so the community knows what it's being used for and not having to ask each time.

David and Nicolas need to publish a new whitepaper of where Ultra is and what the future plans are."

Community member "Cole" (UltraIsLife.com creator) added:

"It's clear Ultra has probably <50 people who are in the 'community' and most of those are simply after some sort of justification/apology or worse from Ultra..

There is no point Ultra justifying and going over all the mistakes they made.. that's not going to improve the situation and NDAs probably stop half the information being released anyway..

But it looks like if Ultra want to continue and retain any of the current community (getting new community members almost impossible in current climate) then they need to lay out what they can on the table..

Clear direction. Both CEOs here everyday explaining (not sure what else the staff has left to do). A formal apology to show accountability and acknowledgement of failure. A clear idea of how many UOS need to be sold a month to keep current staff and operations stable. No bullshit about goals and partners.. just honest description of what there is left on the table.."

THE FINAL ASSESSMENT

Community member "Ultranauts":
"I said the only possible way forward is for Ultra to give away the company. Even that might not be possible honestly. [...] yup, the only path forward and residual value in ultra is in removing d and n from ownership."

Community member "JC" (Ultra Times):
"Yes, we probably need to remove Ultra from the equation. [...] The residual value lies in the community (much of which is dormant), which brings together a large number of visionaries. This is what we must capitalize on when we take back control."

Community member "MANDN":
"Without the genuine company, trusted management and employees that were meant to bring in those partners what's left with the blockchain and contracts could easily be replicated and better."

DECEMBER 2025 SUMMARY

By December 2025, the situation was clear:

TECHNICAL REALITY:

• Core infrastructure (dfuse) no longer operational
• Technology aging and becoming obsolete
• Massive technical debt requiring expensive remediation
• No revenue generation despite 7 years of development

FINANCIAL REALITY:

• €40K/month operational costs
• Funded entirely by UOS token sales
• Regular dumps on exchanges (1.5M+ UOS at a time)
• Zero revenue from platform or services

LEADERSHIP REALITY:

• David Hanson: Complete silence, no public communication
• Nicolas Gilot: Sporadic engagement, defensive responses
• Gus van Rijckevorsel: Disappeared completely
• Community manager trying to manage impossible situation

COMMUNITY REALITY:

• Faith completely destroyed
• <50 active members remaining
• Demands for accountability ignored
• Technical partners insulted and driven away
• No path forward visible

IX. THE REGULATORY QUESTIONS

ESTONIAN FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY (FSA)

As the regulator overseeing Ultra Corporation OÜ, the Estonian FSA has jurisdiction over MiCA compliance. Key questions:

1. Has the FSA been notified of the April-September discrepancy?
2. Is an investigation underway?
3. What enforcement actions are being considered?
4. How will investors be protected?

Community Member "Fabio" raised this concern:

"Looks like Ultra OÜ won't give us transparency on the UOS sales by Gus, David and Nicolas. Not sure which authorities are in charge here, for a criminal investigation. Belgium or Estonia?"

NOIA CAPITAL'S ROLE

The April announcement prominently featured NOIA Capital:

"Led by Luxembourg-based multi-family office NOIA Capital through its NOIA Digital Assets fund."

Questions for NOIA Capital:

1. What was the actual structure of the investment?
2. Why was €10M in inaccessible debt included in the "$12M" figure?
3. Were you aware the announcement might be misleading?
4. What due diligence was conducted?
5. Do you stand by the investment?

CROSS-BORDER IMPLICATIONS

The case involves multiple jurisdictions:

• ESTONIA: Company registration, crypto-asset issuance
• BELGIUM: Nicolas Gilot's residence, potential Belgian law violations
• LUXEMBOURG: NOIA Capital's base of operations
• EU-WIDE: MiCA applies across all member states

This complexity may affect enforcement, but MiCA was designed for exactly such cross-border scenarios.

X. THE PATTERN QUESTION

2024 PRECEDENT?

Community discussions reference similar patterns in 2024. "dakweenx" mentioned a previous case:

"An ex Ultra C-suite on X claimed several times to have reported Ultra to the French authorities, though it's unclear whether he actually did so. He deleted his account shortly afterward."

Community member "jor_ice" expressed resignation:

"How is this sh*t show still running? I check every few days for the 'Unfortunately...' message."

OBSERVATIONS ON LEADERSHIP PATTERN

Community member "M4k" made an observation:

"The founder thinks like an entitled employee. Don't get fooled ALL entrepreneur only get paid when (and if) they make it. Most actually lose money but we never hear from them. This project needs a Leader. Maybe time to share what was wrong with that Gus and not repeat the mistake. I read a lot of malicious intent and no reason not to believe it."

Community Member "Fabio" commented on patterns:

"I'm not saying it was a planned scam from the very beginning, although I keep finding hints that they always exaggerated and embellished things in a 'grey area way'. The football manager being 'on hold' to keep the hopium alive is one such example. It's been dead for a long time."

He added:

"I also stated in the past that there is a level of incompetence that becomes indistinguishable from sabotage or fraud. Maybe it's just that, maybe a grey area. I still don't see how David and Nicolas are the right people to save this project."

THE EXODUS PATTERN

Community member "Comrade" observed the pattern of departures:

"Out of common decency he should be communicating, he's been the central figure for this 7 year ordeal. But has sloped off into the woodwork since its all gone tits up. Cowardly really. The shift to Nicolas is a ploy to mitigate damage. They've created the space for Gus and Dave to get away, Nic is buying time and managing the crowd before he inevitably does the same."

XI. WHAT COMES NEXT

POSSIBLE REGULATORY OUTCOMES

SCENARIO 1: FSA INVESTIGATION

• Formal investigation launched
• Evidence gathering (announcements, Discord logs, blockchain data)
• Preliminary findings
• Potential fines or sanctions

SCENARIO 2: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

• If evidence suggests intentional fraud
• Cross-border cooperation (Estonia, Belgium)
• Personal liability for executives
• Potential criminal penalties

SCENARIO 3: CIVIL LITIGATION

• Token holders pursue damages
• Class action possibility
• Investor lawsuits for misrepresentation
• Recovery of losses

SCENARIO 4: NO ACTION

• Regulatory resources limited
• Case falls through cracks
• Community left without recourse
• Precedent of non-enforcement set

COMMUNITY OPTIONS

FOR TOKEN HOLDERS:

• Document losses and decisions made based on April announcement
• File complaints with Estonian FSA (instructions at fi.ee)
• Explore collective legal action
• Demand transparency from leadership

FOR DEVELOPERS:

• Assess grant program viability given funding reality
• Consider alternative platforms
• Share experiences to warn others
• Advocate for accountability

FOR PARTNERS:

• Review partnerships made post-April announcement
• Assess whether decisions were made under false pretenses
• Consider legal remedies if materially affected
• Evaluate future relationship with Ultra

XII. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

As we conclude this investigation, critical questions remain unanswered:

ABOUT THE FUNDING

1. Why was €10M in inaccessible debt included in "$12M funding" announcement?
2. Who approved the wording of the April 3 announcement?
3. When did leadership know the funding was insufficient?
4. Why wasn't the discrepancy disclosed for 169 days?
5. Was NOIA Capital aware of how the investment would be characterized?

ABOUT TOKEN SALES

6. How much UOS did Nicolas Gilot sell April-September 2025?
7. How much did David Hanson sell during the same period?
8. How much did Gus van Rijckevorsel sell?
9. Were these sales coordinated with the April announcement and MEXC listing?
10. Why does blockchain data appear inconsistent with stated compensation?

ABOUT LEADERSHIP

11. Where is Gus van Rijckevorsel?
12. Why has David Hanson gone silent?
13. Why did Rod leave in August, before the September revelation?
14. Who is actually running Ultra Corporation OÜ?
15. What accountability will leadership face?

ABOUT THE FUTURE

16. Is the DAO proposal genuine community governance or deflection?
17. How can Ultra fund operations with only €2M?
18. What happens to the Developer Grant Program?
19. Will there be any consequences for the misleading announcement?
20. Can the community ever trust Ultra leadership again?

XIII. CONCLUSION

WHAT WE KNOW

• APRIL 3, 2025: Ultra announced it had "successfully secured $12 million in funding."
• SEPTEMBER 19, 2025: Ultra admitted only €2M was accessible equity, with €10M in unusable debt.
• THE GAP: 169 days between claim and clarification.

THE IMPACT: Community members, developers, and partners made decisions based on false impression of financial health.
THE PATTERN: Repeated issues with transparency and accountability.

WHAT WE DON'T KNOW

• Whether regulators will investigate
• How much insiders profited during the deception period
• Whether anyone will face consequences
• If the DAO proposal addresses any of these issues
• What happens to community members who trusted the announcements

WHAT WE BELIEVE

As an independent publication serving the Ultra community, Ultra Times believes:

1. Transparency is non-negotiable in blockchain projects
2. Regulatory compliance matters - MiCA exists for good reason
3. Accountability cannot be avoided through DAO proposals
4. Communities deserve truth from leadership
5. Evidence must be preserved for potential investigations

OUR COMMITMENT

Ultra Times will continue investigating and reporting on this story. We will:

• Monitor regulatory developments
• Track blockchain data for additional evidence
• Document community impact
• Preserve evidence for investigators
• Demand answers to unanswered questions
• Support efforts for accountability

This is not the end of the story. It's the beginning of accountability.